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1 Introduction
Human smuggling entails huge costs for societies. First, it is a dangerous op-
eration, which frequently results in the death of those involved. Each year,
an estimated 2,000 people are drowned in the Mediterranean on their journey
from Africa to Europe (The Economist, August 06, 2005) and many more on
other routes. Even when migrants are successful at reaching destination areas,
they are often exploited in transit and destination countries and deprived of
economic and human rights due to their illegal status (see for example Poulin,
2005 on prostitution and human tra¢cking or Human Rights Watch, 2000, on
bonded labour in sweatshops).1 Second, crossing borders illegally entails very
high nancial costs. For border crossings such as from Mexico into the United
States, human smugglers can charge up to $4,000, while trans-pacic crossings
of Chinese immigrants into the United States cost above $35,000 in the mid
90s and have since increased sharply.2 This makes people smuggling a lucrative
business. As of 2003, it brought over $5 billion revenues a year in the US and
around e4 billion in the EU (Padgett, 2003).3 Finally, over the years, human
smuggling has integrated with other types of illegal and lucrative transnational
activities such as drug shipping and prostitution. Led by international criminal
organizations they pose a threat to the rule of law in countries of origin, transit,
and destination.
Although it is important for policy makers to understand why such illegal ac-
tivities and their associated criminalities are so prevalent, there are surprisingly
very few studies on the supply side of illegal migration (noticeable exceptions
1Tra¢cking victims coming from 127 countries have been found in 137 countries around
the world. It is estimated that there are at least 2.4 million persons who are the victims
of tra¢cking at any time. The most visible form of exploitation is for sexual purposes and
approximately 79% of tra¢cking victims are tra¢cked for sexual exploitation, with 18% being
tra¢cked for forced labour. While it is di¢cult to ascertain, it is estimated that over US$30
billion are generated in prots by tra¢cked persons every year (UNODC 2012).
2On smugglers fees paid by Chinese migrants in the 1990s see Friebel and Guriev, 2006. On
fees paid in 2010 see the website: http://www.havocscope.com/black-market-prices/human-
smuggling-fees/ which also gives references to its sources of information.
3The annual associated ows of smuggled immigrants are estimated to be at around 350,000
in the US and 800,000 in the EU (The Economist 6 August 2005). These rough estimates
should be dealt with caution as reliable data on such illegal activity are di¢cult to obtain.
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are Friebel and Guriev, 2006 and Tamura, 2010, as surveyed by Mahmoud and
Trebesch, 2010). The paper contributes to this new literature by, rst, studying
the industrial organization of human smuggling, notably smugglers pricing and
supply of services, and second, exploring what type of economic policies can be
implemented to ght against them.
Current migration policies, which combine quotas on visas with repression
of illegal migration, are very ine¤ective instruments to ght against the illegal
migration business.4 In fact, strong restrictions on labour mobility imply that
many candidates are obliged to arrange long distance migration with the help of
intermediaries who organise air, sea or ground transportation and provide them
with forged documents, clothes, food and accommodation during the trip (de
Haas, 2006). Empirically, the question as to whether repressive measures are
e¤ective at decreasing the number of illegal migrants is still very much debated.
It is indeed di¢cult to obtain good data on illegal migration and to identify
the causal impact of the policies. In spite of these di¢culties a few empirical
papers investigate the determinants of illegal migration and attempt to assess its
responsiveness to border enforcement measures (Donato et al., 1992, Massey and
Espinosa, 1997, Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999, Hanson et al., 2002, Angelucci
2004). To our knowledge, all existing evidence on illegal migration focuses on
cross border migration between the US and Mexico and points to a small or
insignicant e¤ect of stricter deportation rules and stricter border controls after
the Immigration Reform and Control Act (for a review see Hanson, 2006). For
example, using detailed data on cross-border trips of illegal workers from the
Mexican Migration Project, Gathman (2008) shows that the price elasticity of
demand for illegal migration is relatively small: when the price to cross the
border with the help of coyotes increases, migrants may choose to migrate by
4 Illegal migration represents a sizeable proportion of the foreign population living in high
wages countries. In Europe for example, the Clandestino Research Project estimates that 1.8
to 3.3 million irregular foreign residents live in the old Member States of the EU15 in 2008
(See at: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/ or Dustmann and Frattini, 2011). This represents
0.46% to 0.83% of their population and 7% to 12% of their foreign population. Worldwide,
the International Labour Organisation estimates that 10 to 15 per cent of migration today
involves migration under irregular situations i.e. entering or working in countries without
authorization (http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_492_engl.pdf).
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their own means and forego the services of smugglers by taking additional risks
to cross the border in more remote areas.
However, we expect long distance migration to respond more strongly to
smugglers prices as it is not feasible without their services. Although there is
no evidence on the price elasticity of long haul illegal migration, we know from
history that long distance legal migration responded strongly to changes in the
market structure of shipping cartels at the beginning of the 20th century. This
has been tested empirically by Deltas et al (2008), who show that the existence
of relatively tight, well-organized cartels restricted the ow of transatlantic mi-
grants below what would have occurred in a more competitive environment.
Today, illegal migration still entails sizeable costs, which may continue to be
prohibitively expensive for poor workers and may depend strongly on the in-
dustrial organisation of smugglers.
Since repressive policies are ine¤ective at eliminating smugglers, this paper
focuses on what would happen if a government used basic economic tools, such
as price schemes, to ght them by o¤ering candidates the option to pay a fee to
cross the border legally. The idea of selling migration visas to regulate migration
ows is not new: policy proposals have already fed many debates in the general
press, blogs and policy reports (see Becker, 2002, the Becker-Posner blog of 31rst
July 2005, Freeman, 2006, Orrenius and Zavodny 2010, Saint Paul, 2009 and
early discussions by Simon, 1989), and been strongly criticised by other econo-
mists such as A.Banerjee or S.Mullainathan (The Economist, 26 June 2010).
The opponents of such legalisation argue that the sale of visas may generate
a new type of bonded labour between indebted migrants and their employers
and that the market does not necessarily allocate resources e¢ciently. The
proponents of legalisation argue that, instead of fuelling the maa by restrict-
ing migration, governments should collect money by selling visas (for instance
through auctions). Indeed a business can only be controlled and taxed if it
is legal. The government hence realizes a double benet: rst it collects new
taxes, and second it spends less on repression because maa organisations are
weakened by the legalisation of their business.
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Despite the controversy, legalisation has not yet been analysed as a tool
to eradicate the smuggling industry and its implications in terms of migration
equilibrium have not been fully studied by scholars or policy makers. By legali-
sation we mean total elimination of the smuggling industry through selling visas
and not the exceptional amnesties, which have been repeatedly granted in the
past to illegal migrants living in European countries such as Spain, Greece or in
the US and pose an obvious problem of time consistency and credibility of the
state.5 Our goal is thus to develop a model of legalisation to assess its policy
relevance. We analyse how a set of tools including the sale of visa and vari-
ous repressive measures, can be used to ght against smugglers while possibly
achieving pre-dened migration ow targets. We do not discuss the optimality
of such targets, nor the restrictive migration policies adopted by most advanced
economies or their lax enforcement (for an analysis of such issues see Facchini
and Testa, 2010).
Our analysis shows that the sale of visas at smugglers price, or higher, will
not be su¢cient to eliminate smugglers, nor to improve the skill composition of
migrants. Indeed prohibition creates a barrier to the entry of the market where
it applies. Maa organisations rely on this legal barrier, and on violence, to
cartelize the industry. They are hence able to charge high prices. We may thus
expect the operation of smugglers cartels not to a¤ect all immigrants equally
but to act as a positive selection on immigrants, with higher prices dispropor-
tionately reducing the ow of lower income immigrants.6 In this context the big
markups imply that smugglers may respond to legalisation measures by lowering
the price they propose to would-be migrants and still make a prot. Legalisation
will hence increase the ows of migrants and worsen their skill composition.
To be more specic we model the migration market as follows. The demand
comes from workers, who choose to work in the foreign country or in the origin
5See Chau, 2001, Epstein and Weiss, 2001, Karlson et al., 2003, Solano, 2009 on the
rationale and optimal design of amnesties. See Mas, 2009, on their questionable e¤ectiveness
at decreasing the number of illegal migrants.
6Similar e¤ects were reported by multiple contemporary accounts following the cartelization
of the shipping industry at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century
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country, weighing the benets of higher wages in foreign countries against mi-
gration costs. Migration price is determined by smugglers who maximise their
prots. Policies shape the market structure. They may reinforce the market
power of the smugglers by increasing their costs to operate and hence their
prices, or force them to propose lower prices to compete with the migration
visas on sale. We will see that neither traditional repressive measures nor more
"innovative" pricing tools through the sale of migration visas are satisfactory
policies. The former help to control migration ows but, far from suppressing
smugglers, they may even increase their market power and the price paid by
the migrants for their service. The latter help to eradicate smugglers activ-
ities at the cost of substantially increasing migration ows. The paper then
explores how a combination of these measures may be e¤ective at eradicating
smugglers and controlling migration ows, without necessarily increasing the
budget decit. Finally, using our model and estimates from previous studies
on Chinese migration to the US, we calibrate the price of visas, which would
drive smugglers out of business. This price varies between around $18000 when
the risk of deportation for illegal migrants is low (around 20%) and around
$50000 in case of high risk (around 70%). This result illustrates the importance
of combining repression and legalisation to control demand: with a high level
of repression leading to high risk of deportation for illegal migrants it is easier
for the government to apply a high price for the visas, which will eliminate
smugglers. In practice repression can take di¤erent forms and target di¤erent
groups: the smugglers, the illegal migrants or the rms which employ them.
Our simulations show that to implement legalisation without increasing migra-
tion ows, a government would need to increase by more than three times the
marginal costs for smugglers to operate compared to its level under the status-
quo. Alternatively this would require increasing the probability of deportation
or enforcing rms controls to reduce migrants expected earnings to around
40% those of workers with the same skills employed in the legal sector of the
economy. Several reasons why e¤ective combinations of pricing and repression
instruments have not yet been implemented to eradicate human smuggling are
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then discussed with the policy implications of the paper.
There is an expanding theoretical literature on illegal immigration control,
following Ethier (1986). Epstein et al.(1999) take into account its dynamic as-
pects, as migrants who enter legally may subsequently move into the illegal
sector in order to avoid deportation and Djaji´c (1999) investigates its coun-
terproductive e¤ects as migrants may move into new sectors and new areas,
where new migration networks may form. In practice countries such as Israel,
Cyprus and Lebanon have tried to regulate long distance migration through
local agencies located in South East Asian countries such as Philippines and Sri
Lanka. These legal intermediaries organise the shipment of cheap labour force
to compensate for shortages in labour. As migrants under these schemes are
obliged to return to their home country at the end of their contract, this is the
source of another type of illegal migration from those overstaying illegally in the
destination country (Djaji´c, 2011, Schi¤, 2011).
However, none of the papers on illegal migration mentioned above takes into
account the organisation of the supply side of the market by smugglers, which is
the main focus of our paper and is an important determinant of long haul migra-
tion ows, as suggested by the historical evidence on shipment cartels. Similarly
none of the papers on legalisation studies the possibility of using standard eco-
nomic tools such as sale of visas to control migration ows and the impact of
such legalisation on migration equilibrium. While focusing on this particular
channel of illegal entry (i.e., through the services of smugglers) makes the origi-
nality of the paper, this also limits the interpretation of the policy implications.
We may expect spill-over e¤ects on other channels, if would-be migrants choose
between di¤erent methods of entry, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
By studying the response by smugglers to policy measures, our paper is
close in spirit to Friebel and Guriev (2006), who model how smugglers estab-
lish labour/debt contracts with poor migrants, which force them to repay their
fee. In this context, they show that deportation and border control policies
do not have the same e¤ects on illegal migration: stricter deportation policies
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may increase the ow of illegal immigrants and worsen the skill composition
of immigrants while stricter border controls decrease overall immigration and
may result in an increase in debt-nanced migration. A key assumption of their
model is that migrants are liquidity constrained and cannot pay upfront the fee,
which gives rise to these contracts.7 In a di¤erent context where contracts are
not legally enforceable between tra¢ckers and smuggled migrants, which leads
to migrants exploitation, Tamura (2010) shows that destination countries with
limited resources may prefer to improve the apprehension of smugglers and their
clients at the border rather than inland.
In contrast to these papers we do not focus on liquidity constrained or on ex-
ploited smuggled migrants but on all workers who use the services of smugglers
to migrate illegally8 and we study the e¤ects of a larger set of policy measures -
sale of visas versus more traditional repressive policies through border enforce-
ment, deportation or employers sanctions - on the equilibrium of the market
for smuggled migrants. Our results show that only a combination of them may
be e¤ective at both eliminating smugglers businesses and controlling migration
ows, while limiting increases in budget decit entailed by stricter controls.
These results are robust to the introduction of risk, which, with the noticeable
exceptions of Woodland and Yoshida (2006) and Vinogradova (2010), has rarely
been addressed in previous studies on illegal immigration control.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up of
the model and describes the market structure for illegal migration under status
quo (absence of legalisation). Section 3 studies the e¤ects of introducing pricing
tools and repressive measures to regulate migration ows. Section 4 extends
our model by taking into account the strong uncertainty that represents illegal
migration for risk averse individuals. Section 5 uses calibrations to illustrate
7Migrants may also respond to these debt labour contracts by choosing optimally the du-
ration of repayment period and consumption behaviour and this a¤ects the complementarities
between border controls, deportation measures and employer sanctions as studied by Djaji´c
and Vinogradova, 2011.
8Note that nancial constraints are likely to be less binding with the introduction of visas
as migrants can more easily get a regular loan. And legalisation diminishes the scope for
human tra¢cking as laws can be more easily enforced against exploitative smugglers.
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the policy implications of the model and Section 6 concludes.
2 Migration equilibrium
This section studies the migration market equilibrium, when workers pay a mi-
gration price to the smugglers, p, to migrate illegally to a high wages destination
country. We thereby assume that individuals need to hire a smuggler if they
wish to migrate.9 For simplicity of exposition, the analysis is rst derived un-
der the assumption that illegal migration entails no risk or equivalently that
individuals are risk neutral. Section 4 shows that our results are robust to the
introduction of risk aversion.
2.1 Demand for illegal migration
At the beginning of her working life of total duration 1, a worker maximises her
lifetime utility. With perfect foresight she chooses her location either abroad or
in her home country and consumes all her income.10
Workers are heterogeneous according to their labour e¢ciency (or skill),
, which is distributed identically and independently according to the density
function f() and distribution F () over

; 

with   0.11
If there is no migration visa for sale, we assume that workers can only work
in the illegal sector of the economy such that expected earnings abroad are
dwf , with wf being the wages in the legal sector and d < 1. The discount
factor d simply captures the fact that workers would have more opportunities if
they worked legally rather than illegally.12 We assume for the moment that d
9Although gures vary a lot across destination countries, we expect this to be the case where
it is di¢cult to migrate through di¤erent channels, in particular when migration policies are
very restrictive and when geographical borders do not exist between origin and destination
countries. In the UK for example smugglers are involved in around 75% of detected cases of
illegal border crossing (IND, 2001).
10As there is no sequential decision-making the model is essentially static.
11 Instead of considering skill heterogeneity, we could easily embed into the model other
dimensions of heterogeneity, which may a¤ect the returns to migration (such as physical
abilities or degrees of risk aversion in the extended model with risk outlined below) without
changing its main results.
12 It is for example the case if they cannot easily change employer in the illegal sector or if
they are caught in a debt-labour contract upon arrival (see Friebel and Guriev, 2006).
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is exogenous but we will relax this assumption later on, in line with empirical
evidence (Cobb-Clark et al., 1995).
Note that the way we model the returns to skills leads to a positive selec-
tion of illegal migrants. Indeed long distance illegal migration ows, which are
di¢cult to undertake without the help of smugglers, are very costly for workers
from low wages countries and this is likely to lead to a more positive selection
of workers than that which has been documented for the Mexican migration.13
This also turned out to be the case in the High-Costs migration period after
1993 for Mexican workers, who were more severely liquidity constrained (Borger,
2011).14
The worker knows the discounted income she will earn in the foreign country
on the illegal market, dwf , which is assumed higher than the discounted income
in home country wh:
dwf > wh
Note also that the labour market is considered exogenous, which is justied
by the fact that the number of workers on the labour market is very large
as compared to the ows of migrants. If she lives abroad earnings are used
to consume and to pay for migration price p, such that she consumes dwf   p
whereas, if she stays in origin country, she consumes wh:15 Therefore the worker
decides to migrate if her life time utility, equal to u(dwf   p) in case she
migrates, is higher than her utility in case she does not migrate, equal to u(wh).
With increasing utility functions, the migration condition can be rewritten as
13As Hatton and Williamson put it (2008) "Greater distances, [...] and (for the poorest
regions) the poverty constraint all imply that US and EU migrants coming from farther away
should be more positively selected". However, most of the empirical evidence we have on
selection is either on legal migration (see Beine et al, 2007 or Docquier and Rapoport, 2007)
or on cross-border illegal migration between Mexico and the US such that it is di¢cult to
validate this assumption empirically.
14Although we present the model in the case of positive selection, it can easily be extended
to the case of negative selection or intermediate selection as shown in the Appendix (8.1). In
these cases, the key insights of the model would be very similar provided that the sale of visas
is carefully designed and targeted to low-skilled workers in order to be e¤ective at eradicating
the smuggling industry.
15She perfectly knows the wages per unit of time that she will get at home and abroad and
the discount rate. She computes the net present value of her future ow of income. Since
wages and discount rate are exogenous we avoid introducing separate notation and directly
focus on net present values.
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wh < dwf   p. This shows that individuals are more likely to migrate the
higher the wage di¤erential between foreign and home countries, the higher their
skill level (what we called "positive selection") and the lower the migration costs.
Solving for the skill level such that an individual is indi¤erent between mi-
grating illegally or not, we obtain the illegal migration threshold I written
as:
I =
p
dwf   wh
(1)
And aggregating over the distribution of skills, we obtain the demand for illegal
migration as a function of migration price p:
DI(p) =
Z 
I
f()d = 1  F (I) (2)
As I increases with p and decreases with d, the demand for migration is higher
the lower the migration price, p, and the higher the wages di¤erential dwf  wh
between the two countries.
2.2 Supply of services
Because legal restrictions constitute barriers to market entry, the smuggling
business is concentrated. A few criminal networks actually provide the service.
We model the oligopolistic market for illegal migration as a generalized Cournot
competition. We focus on symmetric equilibrium (i.e., each smuggler has the
same market share). The detail of the computation is in Appendix 8.2. The
generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN , is such that:
pN   c
pN
=
1
N
1
"DI ;p
(3)
It is easy to check that when there is only one smuggler, N = 1, we are back to
the standard monopoly case p1 = pm: the Lerner index is equated to the inverse
of the price elasticity of demand. When on the contrary N !1 we obtain the
competitive case so that p1 = c: The generalized Cournot competition demand
is between these two extreme cases: DI(pm) < DI(pN ) < DI(c) for all N > 1.
11
For instance in the case of a uniform distribution of skills over [0; 1], the
following easily tractable closed form solution is derived (see Appendix 8.2):
pN =
dwf   wh +Nc
N + 1
(4)
and the demand
DI(pN ) =
N
N + 1

1 
c
dwf   wh

(5)
is between the demand on a monopolistic market DI(pm) = 12  
c
2(dwf wh)
; and
the demand in perfect competition DI(c) = 2DI(pm).
The analysis of smugglers pricing behavior outlines that repressive policy
measures may have very di¤erent e¤ects depending on whether they directly
a¤ect the smuggling business or the demand for their services: any measure
which increases the marginal costs for smugglers to operate, c, such as increased
border enforcement, will necessarily increase the fees paid by would be migrants,
and, hence the abusive power of smugglers. In contrast, measures which decrease
the discount factor to work in illegal sector, d, such as sanctions to employers
of illegal workers that are transmitted into lower wages paid to illegal migrants,
decrease the fees charged by smugglers as they increase the demand elasticity.
In a more dynamic perspective, one could easily endogenise N , the number
of smugglers on the market. Denoting K the level of sunk costs to enter this
market, the number of smugglers N is the integer part of  such that () = K
where () = (p   c)DI(p)= is the rm rent. Therefore any repressive
measure increasing c or K reduces the number of smugglers on the market,
thereby increasing the price they charge for their services and lowering the
demand for illegal migration.
It is also worth noting that the smugglers might face di¤erent populations
of migrants. For instance, illiterate candidate from rural areas are di¤erent
from educated workers from urban centers. If the oligopolistic smugglers can
identify them, they will apply di¤erent prices to these di¤erent populations. As
is standard with third degree price discrimination, groups endowed with the
largest price elasticity will get the smallest price. In contrast captive migrants
12
(i.e., groups with low price elasticity) face higher prices.16
3 Sale of visas
This section studies the e¤ects of selling migration visas when the smugglers have
already paid for the xed costs of smuggling. In order to eradicate smugglers
the government might try to legalize the market for migration. To do so, it
can create a permit to migrate that people can buy. A simple idea would be
to create a permit that will cost the same price, pL, as the price imposed by
the smugglers to illegal migrants, noted pI : pL = pI . However, this policy
will increase migration ows. Comparing the legal migration threshold, written
as L = p
wf wh
, with (1), it is easy to see that, for any given migration price
p, the legal migration threshold is always lower than the illegal one: L(p) 
I(p) 8p > 0. This is because migration pay-o¤s are higher under legal than
illegal migration, which increases the wages di¤erential between foreign and
home countries. More importantly such a pricing policy of legal migration will
not eradicate smuggling.
To determine the pricing scheme for legal migrants a government, which is
a Stackelberg leader, 17 needs to take into account that the smugglers will react
to its policy. The model is thus solved by backwards induction.
3.1 Smugglers reaction to legalisation
By comparing the payo¤s if an individual of type  migrates legally, wf  
pL, with the payo¤s if she migrates illegally, dwf   pI , we can determine the
16Assume that they are J di¤erent pools of migrants identied by j = 1; :::; J . The skill
parameter of workers in group j are distributed identically and independently according to the
density function fj() and distribution Fj() over
h
j ; j
i
. Their wages might also be type
dependent: fwfj ; whjg. The demand for migration in group j is DIj (p) =
R j
I
j
(p)
fj()d =
1 Fj(
I
j (p)), where 
I
j (p) =
p
dwfj whj
. The optimal smuggler prices determined by (3) vary
from one group to the other according to the price elasticity of its demand "DI
j
;p =  
pDI0j (p)
DI
j
(p)
.
17This is the natural assumption as, once the government announces its policy, it must stick
to it to be credible.
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threshold type, L; dened as :
L =
pL   pI
(1  d)wf
(6)
such that any individual above this threshold prefers to migrate legally than
illegally. We can easily check that @L=@d < 0: This simply says that the larger
the income di¤erential between the legal and illegal sectors, the more individuals
prefer to migrate legally than illegally.
Using (1), we can write the threshold type I = p
I
dwf wh
above which an
individual prefers to migrate illegally through the smugglers than to stay in her
origin country. If L < I nobody chooses to migrate illegally. A constraint for
the smugglers is to x their price low enough as compared to the price of a legal
permit in order to attract the workers of type between I and L:
This constraint can be written as : p
I
dwf wh
< p
L pI
(1 d)wf
or, equivalently, as:
pI <
dwf   wh
wf   wh
pL (7)
This shows that the lower the relative payo¤s of illegal migration as compared to
legal migration, captured by the ratio dwf wh
wf wh
, and the lower the legal price of
migration, pL, the more di¢cult it is for the smugglers to satisfy this constraint.
Under this constraint, the demand faced by the smugglers is:
DI(pI ; pL) =
Z pL pI
(1 d)wf
pI
dwf wh
f()d: (8)
Let pN (pL) be the solution of (3) computed with the direct price elasticity of
demand (8), "DI ;pI =  
@DI(pI ;pL)
@pI
pI
DI(pI ;pL)
, which is parameterized by pL. The
price reaction function of the smugglers is the solution of the following equation:
pI(pL) =
(
pN (pL) if pN (pL) < dwf wh
wf wh
pL
0 otherwise
(9)
In the uniform example, we obtain a closed form solution (all mathematical
proofs are derived in Appendix 8.4):
pN (pL) =
pL
N + 1
dwf   wh
wf   wh
+
N
N + 1
c (10)
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The smugglers are active and apply this price if condition (7) holds, which is
equivalent to:
c <
dwf   wh
wf   wh
pL
3.2 Government policies
Illegal activities linked to human smuggling entail large negative externalities
for societies. In Mexico for example, human smuggling is often integrated with
the drug business and other criminal activities, which lead to high insecurity
and became recently one of the main electoral concerns.18 This is also true
for OECD countries, where governments expend considerable ressources in an
attempt to eradicate this industry. For example, Sweden and Australia have
recently adopted strict policies against such criminal networks.19 This Section
studies how economic tools can be used to reach this objective and their e¤ects
on the migration market.
3.2.1 Eliminating smugglers
We rst consider a policy, which aims at breaking all incentives to smuggle.
It consists in applying a low enough price for legal migration such that the
smugglers will have negative prots. This requires that the marginal costs to
smuggle are higher than the reaction price, i.e. pI(pL)  c.
The threshold price, noted pL, below which the smugglers exit the market
is such that L = I dened respectively in equations (6) and (1) for pI = c.
That is, pL is such that:
pL c
(1 d)wf
= c
dwf wh
. This yields:
pL =
wf   wh
dwf   wh
c (11)
18The Economist, June 30, 2011. Time Magazine, August 12, 2003 :
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,474582-2,00.html
19 In its budget 2011-2012 the Australian Government has for instance specically earmarked
"$292 million to support a new Regional Cooperation Framework that will help put people
smugglers out of business and prevent asylum seekers making the dangerous journey to Aus-
tralia by boat." See the Webpage of the Australian Government:
http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Budgets/Budget2011/Mediareleases/Pages/
Strengtheningourbordersthroughregionalcooperation.aspx
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In other words, the government that wants to push smugglers reaction price
down until their mark-up vanishes has to apply the price pL. Note that this
result applies to any initial structure of the market for smugglers: monopolist,
oligopolistic or competitive : irrespective of the initial market conditions, if the
government wants to eradicate smugglers through legalisation it has to apply
pL such that the smugglers end up reaching their marginal costs pricing.
Comparing pL = wf wh
dwf wh
c and ppc = c we can establish, since d < 1, that
the price imposed by the government to eliminate the smugglers is higher than
the price imposed by smugglers under perfect competition. Nevertheless, the
migration demand, which is now legal, can be written as:
DL(pL) =
Z 
c(
wf wh
dwf wh
)
wf wh
f()d
DL(pL) = 1  F

c
dwf   wh

(12)
This demand is exactly the same as the demand for illegal migration under
perfect competition of smugglers: DL(pL) = DI(c): This is because, for a given
migration price, more workers are willing to migrate legally than illegally. This
result, which is robust to the introduction of risk aversion, is summarized in the
next proposition.
Proposition 1 A policy that reduces the number of illegal migrants to zero
through the sale of visas yields the same level of migration as under perfect
competition among smugglers.
It is not possible to empirically test the predictions of Proposition 1 since
no country has, so far, used such a pricing scheme to eradicate human smug-
gling. However, the theoretical framework, which is quite general, applies to
other markets with positive demand and legal prohibition. The theory predicts
that destroying a maa organisation by legalizing its activity will inevitably
increase the demand of the formerly prohibited product or service. It is thus
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useful to look at other products and services, such as alcohol, drugs or sexual
services, that are, or have been, successively prohibited and legalised to assess
the relevance of Proposition 1.
The main problem to test the impact of prohibition on consumption is the
lack of data on trade volume during prohibition time. However, using mortality,
mental health and crime statistics, Miron and Zwiebel (1991) estimate the con-
sumption of alcohol during Prohibition in the US (1920-1933). They nd that
alcohol consumption fell sharply at the beginning of Prohibition, to approxi-
mately 30% of its pre-Prohibition level. During the next several years alcohol
consumption increased, but remained below its pre-Prohibition level, at about
60-70%. Consumption increased to approximately its pre-Prohibition level only
during the decade after Prohibition was abolished.
Another piece of evidence concerns prices. The theory predicts a sharp
decrease in prices if one aims at eliminating maa through legalisation. In line
with this, Miron (2003) shows that cocaine and heroin are substantially more
expensive than they would be in a legalized market: "the data imply that cocaine
is four times as expensive as it would be in a legal market, and heroin perhaps
nineteen times."
Finally, regarding the sex market, Poulin (2005) claims that the legalisation
of prostitution in countries such as the Netherland, Germany or Australia, has
generated an expansion of this industry: "An "abolitionist" country like France,
with a population estimated at 61 million, has half as many prostituted people
on its territory as does a small country like the Netherlands (16 million) and
20 times fewer than a country like Germany, with a population of around 82.4
million."
It is clear that more empirical studies are called to understand the conse-
quences of legalisation. Yet, based on the theory and on the available empirical
evidence, we predict a sharp increase in migration ows if visas were sold at the
price that would drive the smugglers out of business.20 Dismantling the smug-
20The higher the initial concentration of the market the larger the increase in ows following
legalisation.
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glers by lowering the price reduces the number of illegal migrants to zero by
destroying smuggler prots, which is its primary objective, but it also increases
migration ows and worsens their skill composition.
3.2.2 The policy trade-o¤: controlling migration ows
Such increases may not be acceptable in most OECD countries, where there
is a strong popular demand for controlling migration ows. As we mentioned
earlier we do not discuss here the optimality of such an objective but simply
analyse whether standard economic instruments can help to reach it. We thus
study what happens if the government sells visas to control migration ows. A
constraint for the government is that the price of these visas, pL, has to be lower
than pL, the threshold price above which no worker will migrate legally. This
threshold is the minimum value of two constraints:
 The (IR) constraint: pL  (wf   wh), which implies that someone at
least prefers to migrate legally than stay at home, and
 The (IC) constraint: pL  (1   d)wf + pI , which implies that someone
at least prefers to migrate legally than illegally.
The legal migration is positive if and only if pL  min
n
(wf   wh); (1  
d)wf + p
I
o
. Since by assumption 1, dwf > wh it is easy to check that the (IC)
constraint is binding whenever the smugglers are active. Indeed (wf   wh) >
(1   d)wf + p
I is equivalent to pI < (dwf   wh), which, by virtue of (1),
necessarily holds when the smugglers are active. We deduce that pL = (1  
d)wf + p
I . Since the smugglers price, pI(pL), is endogenously determined in
equation (9), the threshold pL is a xed point such that:
pL = (1  d)wf + p
I(pL) (13)
Under the assumption that @
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
 0, which for instance holds with a
uniform distribution of skills, one can check that dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 (see Appendix
8.3). This implies that pL exists and is unique. Indeed if pL = 0 then (1  
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d)wf + p
I(0) > 0, while (1  d)wf + pI(+1) = (1  d)wf + pN < +1 where
pN is dened in equation (3). We deduce that pL and (1 d)wf + pI(pL) cross
once and only once at pL > 0. It is worth noting that, contrary to pL which is
invariant, pL depends on N the number of smugglers active in the market.21
We want to study the objective function of a government that would aim
at minimizing the increase in migration ows following the introduction of sale
of visas. Since the status quo level of immigration is independent of the new
policy to sell visas, this objective is equivalent to minimizing migration ows
following this scheme. By using (1) the objective function is :
min
pLpL
Z 
pI (pL)
dwf wh
f()d = min
pLpL

1  F

pI(pL)
dwf   wh

(14)
where the government internalizes the reaction function of the smuggler pI(pL)
in (9). Since dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 di¤erentiating equation (14) with respect to pL yields
  1
dwf wh
f

pI(pL)
dwf wh

dpI(pL)
dpL
 0. A government, which aims at minimizing
migration ows, will x the highest possible price for its visas pL.
The migration demand under such policy is higher than in the case of an
unconstrained smuggler oligopoly. Indeed when pL  pL  (wf   wh); the
smugglers are the only ones to be active on the market as nobody wants to
migrate legally if the smugglers apply their optimal reaction price pI(pL). How-
ever they cannot apply the unconstrained oligopoly price pN of equation (3)
as some migrants would then choose legal migration, lowering the smugglers
prot. This entails larger migration ows even though no visa is sold in such
case.22
Figure 1 illustrates this result in the uniform example. It shows the reac-
tion function pI(pL) as dened by (10) where the non-zero part of the reaction
function, pN (pL) = p
L
N+1
dwf wh
wf wh
+ N
N+1c, decreases with N  1. It becomes at
21This result illustrated below in the uniform distribution example is intuitive: the upper
limit for visa prices decreases with the number of smugglers on the market since their response
price decreases with the degree of competition and the government has to compete with them
to encourage legal migration.
22Smugglers are unconstrained to apply their oligopolistic price only when pL > (wf wh).
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when N goes to innity (i.e. it converges to the constant value of c).23
The next proposition, which is robust to the introduction of risk-aversion,
summarizes the policy result this section implies:
Proposition 2 Regulating migration ows through the sale of migration visas
necessarily increases the total number of migrants and lowers their average skill
level.
Proposition 2 implies that a government that aims at minimizing the demand
for migration, cannot do better than an unconstrained monopoly smuggler. So,
if the objective is to decrease the total number of migrants, there are more
e¤ective policies than selling migration visas. Using our results above it is
straightforward to check that any instrument that increases the concentration
of smugglers on the market through the entry sunk cost, increases their costs to
operate, c, or decreases the benets of illegal migration, d, is more e¤ective at
controlling migration demand.
So far we have considered two types of policies: one policy relies on pricing
schemes and economic tools to eliminate smuggling, while the other policy is
essentially repressive and aims at controlling illegal migration ows. Both solu-
tions are politically unsatisfactory. The former leads to a substantial increase
in migration ows, while the latter does not eradicate smugglers and increase
P
their market power (i.e., market concentration). In what follows we explore
how a combination of both types of approaches might help to simultaneously
ght the smugglers and control migration ows, without increasing the burden
of public decit.
3.2.3 A¤ordable migration control through legalisation
In this section we consider a policy where the funds raised from the sale of the
legal permits are used to ght illegal migration by increasing c and decreasing
23With the uniform distribution example, replacing (10) into (13) the upper limit for the visa
price satises: pL =

Nc+ (1 +N)(1  d)wf
 wf wh
(1 d)wf+N(wf wh)
. Comparing the reaction
smugglers price pI(pL) with the unconstrained smugglers oligopoly price pN dened in (3)
it is straightforward to check that pI(pL)  pN if and only if dwf   wh  c, which is the
necessary condition for the smugglers being active in the rst place (see the Appendix 8.4).
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d in such a way that increases in migration ows following the legalisation are
limited as much as is a¤ordable.
We start from the status quo situation where the marginal cost to smuggle
is c and the discount rate to work as an illegal workers is d. The government
can use a share of the new funds raised through the sale of migration permits
to increase the smugglers marginal costs by reinforcing "external" (or border)
controls. We denote c(R1) the marginal costs that the smugglers face when
the government invests R1  0 in additional repression. We assume that, in
the absence of additional investment, the marginal costs of the smuggler are
the status quo level: c(0) = c. Moreover we assume that c0(R1) > 0 and
c00(R1) < 0. The concave shape indicates decreasing returns to scale in the ght
against smugglers.
Similarly, the government can use another share of the funds raised through
the sale of visas to increase "internal" controls at worksites and enforce the
sanctions paid by the employers of illegal migrants. We denote d(R2) the illegal
migrant wage discount factor resulting from increased enforcement measures.
Here again we assume that, in the absence of additional investment d(0) = d,
and that d0(R2) < 024 and d00(R2) > 0. The convex shape indicates decreasing
returns to scale in the ght against illegal employment.
Replacing c by c(R1) and d by d(R2) in (11), we can determine the new legal
migration price such that smugglers do not have any interest to operate given
their inated marginal costs and reduced migrant wages:
pL(R1; R2) =
wf   wh
d(R2)wf   wh
c(R1) (15)
We deduce that the increase in demand following the introduction of the sale
of visas for legal migration would be dened in (12) with the price pL being
replaced by pL(R1; R2):
DL(R1; R2) = 1  F

c(R1)
d(R2)wf   wh

(16)
24See Woodland and Yoshida, 2006, for a theoretical foundation of this assumption and
Cobb-Clark et al.(1995) for empirical evidence.
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Finally, the government chooses the investments R1 and R2 so as to minimize
the increase in migration ows following the introduction of visas, under the
constraint that the cost of repression is covered by the visa sales:
min
R1;R2
DL(R1; R2) s.t. R1 +R2  DL(R1; R2)pL(R1; R2): (17)
Focusing on interior solutions the optimal a¤ordable policy, which is derived in
Appendix 8.5, is summarized in the next proposition.25
Proposition 3 A government that aims at dismantling smugglers while lim-
iting migration ows without increasing its budget decit invests the amounts
(R1; R

2) solution of the following equations:
R1 +R2 = p
L(R1; R2)D
L(R1; R2) (18)
c0(R1)
c(R1)
=
 d0(R2)wf
d(R2)wf   wh
(19)
Equation (18) shows that the government invests the maximum possible
amount in re-enforcing border controls and employers sanctions, which is af-
fordable through the sale of visas. The optimal allocation of the budget for re-
pression is such that the marginal impact of R1 on DL is equal to the marginal
impact of R2 on DL, as shown by (19). Note that enforcing the nes paid by
employers of undocumented workers may contribute to raising additional funds
for the government, which could easily be embedded into our model by adding
a term (increasing with R2) on the right hand side of the budget constraint in
(17). The optimal investments R1 and R2 would be changed accordingly.
Since the demand for visas is a normal good and since c0(R1) > 0 (alterna-
tively d0(R2) < 0) it is straightforward to check that
dDL(R1;R2)
dR1
< 0 (and that
dDL(R1;R2)
dR2
< 0). When repression against smugglers increases, the marginal
cost of their activity, c, increases, which is transmitted to the smugglers price.
Similarly, when sanctions are enforced against employers of illegal migrants, this
is transmitted to the payo¤s of migrants through a decrease in d. As a result
25Depending on the functions c(:) and d(:) it may be the case that the optimal solution
involves repression to increase c only (i.e., R2 = 0) or to decrease d only (i.e., R1 = 0).
However, in other cases there will be an interior solution dened in (19).
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the government can raise the price of legal visas without fuelling smugglers de-
mand. This policy enables the government to control migration ows without
relying on the help of smugglers. Indeed, by construction, such policy pushes
smugglers out of the market by eroding their prots.
4 Risk aversion
So far we considered either situations entailing no risk or risk neutral individ-
uals. It is probably more realistic to consider that individuals are risk averse.
As migrating illegally entails important risks, this may be of signicance to de-
termine the number and type of migrants. This section shows the robustness of
our results to the introduction of risk aversion. It reports only the main results.
For the detailed computations we refer to Appendix 8.6.
We extend the model by introducing standard CARA utility function u(x) =
1  exp( ax); where a is the absolute risk aversion parameter. We also assume
that illegal migration entails a risk: once the migrants pay the sunk costs to
the smugglers and reach the destination country, they may stay abroad with
probability 1   q, but have a probability q of being deported and sent back
to their home country. In order to compare the results in the cases with and
without risk aversion, we assume that if they manage to avoid deportation while
in migration, they earn a wage wf with   1 so that the expected revenue
from illegal migration is the same in the two cases, which can be written as:
(1  q)wf + qwh = dwf (20)
Any distortion can hence be ascribed to the introduction of the risk aversion.
One can check in Appendix 8.6 that the illegal migration threshold Ira is
now a solution of the following equation:
1  e ap
I
1  e a(wf wh)
= 1  q (21)
The risk neutrality (and/or absence of risk) benchmark case of equation (1),
I = p
I
dwf wh
, is simply obtained in equation (21) by setting q = 0, which also
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implies, according to (20), that  = d. Since Ira is increasing with q and since
Ira = 
I when q = 0 we deduce that Ira > 
I for all q > 0. This shows that, as
we may expect, the risk of being deported discourages risk averse individuals to
migrate illegally.
The logic of the pricing scheme of smugglers described in section 2 remains
the same as before but it takes into account the new (lower) demand from risk
averse individuals. Risk aversion implies that the price imposed by smugglers
is then lower than the price they would impose to risk neutral individuals with
the same expected revenue from migration, an intuitive result formally shown
in Appendix 8.6.
Lemma 1 Risk aversion limits the number of illegal migrants, Ira > 
I ,
and reduces the price imposed by smugglers pIra < p
I .
We now turn to the government policy of visa sale and the reaction of smug-
glers. If individuals can buy a legal permit to migrate at price pL, smugglers
need to price their services low enough so that at least one individual wishes
to migrate illegally. The skill level Lra of the migrant who is just indi¤erent
between migrating illegally and legally satises the following equation:
1  e a((wf wh)+p
I pL)
1  e a(wf wh)
= 1  q (22)
Solving for the threshold Lra and comparing it to (6) we show in Appendix 8.6
that risk aversion increases the demand for legal visas as established by Lemma
2.
Lemma 2 Risk aversion increases the demand for legal visas: Lra < 
L .
When legal visas are put on sale, risk averse individuals are willing to pay
a higher price to get valid documentation. Since we also showed that Ira > 
I ,
risk aversion reduces the illegal migration demand, DIra(p
I ; pL) =
R Lra
Ira
f()d =
F (Lra)   F (
I
ra), by the two ends. On the one hand, in the absence of legal
pricing schemes, illegal migration ows are lower if individuals are risk averse
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than if they are risk neutral. On the other hand, selling visas decreases illegal
migration ows even further since individuals are less willing to bear the risk of
deportation.
For the sake of realism we focus on situations where smugglers are initially
active in equilibrium. Their reaction function, pIra(p
L), is the solution of the
same equation as in (9) using the demand DIra(p
I ; pL). If the government wants
to eliminate them by its pricing policy, it still needs to push their reaction price
to the limit value c so that Lra(c; p
L
ra
) = Ira(c). It follows that Proposition 1
holds true under risk aversion.26 If the government wants to eradicate smugglers
through legalisation it will face the same demand as under perfect competition
among smugglers: DL(pL
ra
) = DIra(c). The main di¤erence is that the demand
is lower than in the risk neutral case, DIra(c) < D
I(c):
We show in Appendix 8.6 that pL
ra
is increasing with q. Moreover as for q = 1
pL
ra
= pL this implies that the visa price, which drives smugglers out of business,
is higher with risk (when q > 0) than without as established by Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Risk aversion increases the visa price, which drives the smugglers
out of business: pL
ra
> pL:
Finally the results of section 3.2.2 are robust to the introduction of risk
aversion. If the smuggler is active the binding constraint is the IC and pLra is
the solution of the following equation derived in Appendix 8.6:
e a(wf p
L) = (1  q)e a(wf p
I
ra(p
L)) + qe a(wh p
I
ra(p
L)) (23)
Therefore the rest of the reasoning and Proposition 2 hold true.
Proposition 3 can also be generalized taking into account the risk entailed
by migration. With risk averse migrants the government has more instru-
ments to raise the visa price that drives the smugglers out of business and,
hence, limit migration ows. By investing in repression it can, as before,
26We can also see that Proposition 1 does not depend on the specication of the Demand
function. Hence it is robust to other specications of utility functions.
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increase marginal costs for smugglers to operate through the increasing con-
cave function c(R1), or decrease the benets of working as an illegal worker
through the decreasing convex function (R2). In addition, it can also in-
crease the probability of deportation q through the increasing concave func-
tion q(R3). This new instrument is relevant only under risk aversion. Let
pL(R1; R2; R3) =
wf wh
a((R2)wf wh)
log

1 q(R3)
e c(R1)a q(R3)

be the price that elimi-
nates human smuggling and let DL(R1; R2; R3) = 1   F

pL(R1;R2;R3)
wf wh

be
the legal demand for visas associated with this price. Focusing on interior solu-
tions Proposition 4 summarises how these three instruments can be optimally
combined.27
Proposition 4 A government that aims at dismantling smugglers while lim-
iting migration ows without increasing its budget decit invests the amounts
(R1; R

2; R

3) solution of the following equations:
R1 +R2 +R3 = D
L(R1; R2; R3)p
L(R1; R2; R3) (24)
c0(R1)ae
 c(R1)a
e c(R1)a   q(R3)
=
 0(R2)wf
(R2)wf   wh
log

1  q(R3)
e c(R1)a   q(R3)

=
q0(R3)
1  q(R3)
1  e c(R1)a
e c(R1)a   q(R3)
(25)
As shown by equation (24) the government invests the maximum possible
amount in re-enforcing border controls, employers sanctions and deportations,
which is a¤ordable through the sale of visas. And the optimal allocation of
repression between the various instruments is such that their marginal impact
on the demand is equalized (i.e., @D
L
@R1
= @D
L
@R2
= @D
L
@R3
).
Moreover, we nd that the investment to increase the probability of de-
portation, R3, which minimizes migration ows is higher than the investment
that would minimise expected income from illegal migration (see Appendix 8.6).
This result, in line with Becker 1968, simply states that since individuals are
27Depending on the functions c(:), (:) and q(:) it may be the case that the optimal solution
involves repression to increase c only (i.e., R2 = R3 = 0), to decrease  only (i.e., R1 = R3 =
0), to increase q only (i.e., R1 = R2 = 0), or any combination of two instruments only (i.e.,
R1 = 0 or R2 = 0 or R3 = 0). However, in other cases there will be an interior solution
dened in (25).
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risk averse, they respond more strongly to a change in the probability of de-
portation, q, than to a "compensated" change in their earning, , which would
leave equal their expected income of illegal migration.
The main issue raised by the policy of legalisation combined with tight mi-
gration control is its e¤ectiveness at limiting migration ow without weighing
too much on public nances. This ultimately depends on the elasticities of the
functions c(R1), (R2) and q(R3). Policy makers have to take into account that
these elasticites vary from one country to the other. For example, when there is
a physical border between two countries it is di¢cult to raise smugglers costs
by increasing repression, as the evidence on illegal migration between Mexico
and the US mentioned in the introduction shows. Hence, the elasticity of the
function c(R) is likely to be low. By contrast, in the case of long-haul migration,
it might be easier to increase smugglers costs by reinforcing external controls.
Similarly, in countries with a large informal sector, it will be harder to reduce
, than in countries with a small informal economy. With inelastic functions
c(R1), (R2) and q(R3), the equilibrium price of migration visas will be quite
low. Such a policy of legalisation will be ine¤ective at limiting migration ows,
unless investments into additional repression are extremely high. This poses
a policy trade-o¤: high burden on public nances or large increase in migra-
tion ows, which will be hard to sustain politically. Moreover, in practice, the
way the repressive policy is set up is very important. The goal is to raise the
smugglers costs to increase their concentration, and not necessarily to disman-
tle existing cartels. Breaking established smugglers networks might give rise,
through the emergence of several smaller smuggler networks, to more compe-
tition in the illegal migration business and, hence, to lower prices and higher
demand.28
28The failure of the "war on drugs" launched in the United States in the 1980s has been
partly explained by such e¤ects. The US authorities decided to inltrate the drug maa to
dismantle it. The inltration operation, which was very costly, was successful. The disman-
tling of the well organized cartels which followed gave rise to the emergence of many smaller
drug networks ghting ercely in price to gain market share. As a result, the consumption of
cocaine increased in the US (see Poret 2002).
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5 Policy Implications
As it is impossible to run regressions to test our model, this section uses cali-
brations to interpret its results and quantify the policy e¤ects outlined above.
While interpreting our results we have to keep in mind that they are not full-
edged policy simulations. The model focuses on the migration market only and
abstracts from any other changes that may occur in the rest of the economy as
a consequence of large increases in migration ows. In particular, adjustments
on the labour market may dampen the initial incentives to migrate, leading
to smaller increases in migration ows following sale of visas than the ones we
calibrate. Also, this may generate complex politico-economic problems, as not
everybody in the host country will have the same welfare gains or losses follow-
ing these changes. These are not captured by our model and the implications
we draw below are purely used to illustrate the partial equilibrium e¤ects on
the migration market outlined by our model.
We borrow most of the estimates used in our calibrations from Friebel and
Guriev, 2006, and from the scarce information we have on the smuggling indus-
try from case-studies on Chinese smugglers (Yun and Poisson, 2005). As there is
very little quantitative information on the risk faced by illegal migrants and on
the degree of concentration of the market of smugglers, we also analyse the sen-
sitivity of our simulations when risk varies and when the number of smugglers
varies.29
5.1 Price of visas and migration demand following the le-
galisation
This section estimates the increase in demand for illegal migration following a
legalisation scheme that would keep constant the marginal costs for smugglers
to operate, the sanctions against employers and the probability of deportation
i.e. not using the other available instruments.
Before quantifying the policy implications of our model we check in Appendix
29For example Chin and Zhang, 2002, stress the existence of several smugglers operating in
China.
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(8.7) that the incentive rationality constraint of our model is satised for the
wages di¤erential observed between the US and China in 2005 as well as for a
large range of wage di¤erentials that have been reported between advanced and
developing countries (Clemens et al.,2009).
For all our simulations detailed in the Appendix we need some estimate of
the degree of risk aversion of would-be migrants, a, and of the deportation prob-
abilities q, which are typically di¢cult to observe. Instead, we have some direct
evidence from Chinese smugglers reporting their marginal costs to operate at
around e8000 to cross the borders to France and higher to the US (Yun and
Poisson, 2005), which we estimate to be around $10000 for our simulations.30
Using this information, the lower bound of the price paid by Chinese to migrate
illegally to the US, pI = $35000, and our model we can infer a range of risk
parameters a compatible with a range of deportation probabilities, q (see Ap-
pendix (8.8)). To perform some static comparative on the e¤ects of varying the
risk we can vary q in the neighborhood of the chosen values (a ; q).
We rst simulate the visa price that would eradicate the smugglers using
equation (54). Row 3 of Table I shows that, for each degree of risk aversion
a considered successively in columns (1) to (4), the price increases with risk,
which we established theoretically by Lemma 3. In column (1) this price ranges
between $43624 and $49954 for probabilities of deportation, q; between 0:68
and 0:72. In column (4), the visa price ranges between $17755 and $18957
for probabilities of deportation between 0:18 and 0:22. Since the absolute risk
aversion parameter a compatible with the di¤erent ranges of q decreases with
the probability of deportation, we deduce that the visa price is very sensitive to
the risk entailed by illegal migration. Indeed a relatively high a coupled with
a low q leads to much smaller equilibrium visa prices than a relatively low a
coupled with a high q.
We then estimate the magnitude of the increase in demand resulting from
30This is an average. Marginal costs vary depending on the type of trip undertaken and
on the type of migrant. Some Chinese migrants obtain fake visas and invitations for business
trips, which allow them to travel directly by air. Others have to cross several borders using
several intermediary smugglers, which increases the overall marginal costs of the operation.
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the sale of visas, D =
DLra(p
L
ra
) DIra(p
I)
DIra(p
I)
, which will of course depend on the
distribution of migrants skills. Assuming a uniform distribution, our simula-
tions show that the relative increase in demand following legalisation increases
in risk and varies between around 20% for low values (q = 0:18) and 55% for
high values (q = 0:72), as displayed in Row 4 of the table.
Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix reporting the simulations for N = 3 and
N = 5 show that the more competitive the smugglers market the smaller the
increase D:31 This is an intuitive result since strongly cartelised smugglers
keep the demand for illegal migration at a low level with high prices charged to
migrants. Accordingly our simulations assuming N = 2 give higher bounds for
all implied changes.
5.2 Legalisation with migration control
The simulations above were made assuming that the level of repression is kept
constant by the government. We now allow the government to combine legali-
sation with "repressive" instruments in order to control migration ows. Since
we do not know the functions c(:), q(:) and (:) it is not possible to simulate
the optimal combination of instruments, which would minimise the increase in
demand following the a¤ordable legalisation scheme described in Proposition
4. Instead, we take one given objective, "0 migration increase", and show how
di¤erent repressive instruments may be combined with visa sales to reach it.
Policy makers may rst consider re-inforcing border controls, which would in-
crease marginal costs for smugglers to operate. SolvingDIra(p
I) = DL

pL
ra
(R)

and replacing with (62) and (63) gives straightforwardly c(R) = pI . As c(:) in-
creases with R, this determines a unique level of repression above which the pol-
icy of legalisation with repression brings a lower level of migration than under the
status quo. To give an idea of the magnitude of the required e¤orts we can com-
pare the level of marginal costs for smugglers to operate, which must be equal to
$35000 following the policy, to the marginal costs for Chinese smugglers reported
31We can also use the simulations to show that the compatible values of risk with N = 10
would imply that q is lower than 0:05, which makes this case not very plausible.
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to be around $10000 under status quo. Therefore the policy would require in-
creasing the marginal costs for smugglers by 250% (i.e.c = c(R
) c
c
= 2:5 such
that c(R) = 3:5c). As it seems reasonable to assume decreasing returns to scale
for border enforcement measures this would require increasing by more than 3,5
times the budget allocated to such measures.
Our simulations using (65) also show also that the additional e¤orts required
to reach the objective decrease with the probability of deportation.32 Indeed,
when risk is low the di¤erential between smugglers price and marginal costs is
large. As already shown in Lemma 1, when risk increases smugglers have to
lower their margin to be able to attract risk-averse migrants. It is therefore
easier to drive them out of business and keep migration demand constant when
the risk of deportation increases.
Policy makers could alternatively reinforce the sanctions to employers of
undocumented employees, which would translate into lower expected earnings
abroad for illegal migrants. With the same reasoning as above we determine the
relative decrease in the discounting factor, , which yields the same level of
migration following legalisation as under the oligopolistic market for smugglers
(status quo). Using equation (66) Row 6 of Table I shows that this policy would
require decreasing the discount factor  by around 50%, such that the earnings of
workers employed in the illegal sector of the economy falls below 40% (0:5  0:8)
of those of same skill workers in the legal sector.
For each instrument considered successively we see that the level of addi-
tional investments in repression required decreases with the deportation risk
entailed by illegal migration. Since the risk of deportation q(R) can also be in-
terpreted as a policy instrument, our results highlight strong complementarities
between di¤erent types of repressive instruments. Tables A1 and A2 show the
robustness of the results to N = 3 and N = 5 respectively.33
32Within each column of row 5 of Table I c decreases as q increases. Note that , by
construction of the pairs (a; q), each column is such that c = 2:50 for the central value of q
of the neighbourhood considered.
33Comparing results of Table I with those in Tables A1 for N = 3 or A2 for N = 5 shows
that the e¤orts required to eliminate the smugglers and maintain migration demand constant
are smaller the higher the number of smugglers on the market, an intuitive result. It is indeed
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5.3 Discussion
The previous section highlights the complementarity between the di¤erent re-
pression instruments. The optimal combination depends on the elasticities of the
functions c(R1), (R2) and q(R3). Although we do not have precise estimates of
these elasticities, it seems unlikely that the combination currently adopted by
the US and most EU countries is optimal. There are huge discrepancies between
the amounts invested in border control versus employers sanctions. For exam-
ple, in 2008 in France, only 1706 labour inspectors were employed for more than
3.8 million rms.34 Among those rms, only 1.6 million, the largest ones, were
eligible for a control although many illegal migrants work in small construction
rms and in restaurants.35 At the same time France has spent hundreds of mil-
lions of euros on repression measures such as dismanteling illegal immigrants
camps, police enforcement at the borders and deportation measures. Similarly
in the US, there is very little enforcement against illegal immigration at work-
sites (Hanson, 2007). Between 1999 and 2003, the number of man hours US
immigration agents devoted to worksite inspections declined from 480,000 to
180,000 hours and few US employers who hire illegal immigrants are detected
or prosecuted.36 But considerable amounts have been increasingly invested in
the controls of the US borders.37 The number of man hours spent policing the
US-Mexico border increased by 2.9 times between 1990 and 2005 and the Border
Patrol, which was increased from 9,000 agents in 2001 to 20,000 in 2009, costs
less di¢cult to ght against smugglers when their initial prot is low, which decreases with
the level of competition.
34See the report "Linspection du travail en France en 2008", Ministère du travail, des
relations sociales, de la famille, de la solidarité et de la ville, Direction générale du travail
Service de lanimation territoriale de la politique du travail et de laction de linspection du
travail.
35With only 22590 controls to check for illegal workers, an eligible rm is inspected on
average once every 70 years, or alternatively faces a 1.42% probability of being inspected each
year and smaller rms face a 0 probability of inspection.
36The number of US employers paying nes of at least $5.000 for hiring unauthorized work-
ers was only fteen in 1990, which fell to twelve in 1994 and to zero in 2004 (see "Immigration
Enforcement : Preliminary Observations on Employment Verication and Worksite Enforce-
ment" GAO-05-822T June 21, 2005, cited by Hanson 2007, p19.)
37The Washington Post, July 18, 2010 reported that more than 670 miles of border fences,
walls, bollards and spikes that Congress decreed in 2006 at an estimated cost of $4 billion
(plus future maintenance) had been almost completed.
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an estimated $4 billion annually. The evidence on illegal migration between
Mexico and the US mentioned in the introduction shows that such a policy of
external control is ine¤ective at limiting migration ows.
The e¤ects of stricter internal repression measures, which would increase
penalties paid by employers of undocumented immigrants and deportation prob-
abilities (decreasing  and increasing q), are even less known and studied than
the e¤ects of stricter external controls (increasing c). Yet such policies have
proved to be e¤ective, at least in other industries. Focusing on the sex busi-
ness, Poulin (2005) shows that repressive policy can successfully decrease de-
mand, when, as in Sweden, legislation is passed to prosecute the customers,
who are the nal users of the business. As technologies develop to detect forged
documents, for example using biometric identity cards, prosecuting rms that
employ illegal workers could be a much more cost e¤ective way to legalise and
control migration ows than border enforcement measures. Moreover nes paid
by employers would contribute to raising additional funds to make the legali-
sation policy even more a¤ordable. It is striking that despite several attempts
to mandate participation by all U.S. employers in the E-Verify program, an
Internet-based system designed to check the employment authorization status
of employees, participation is still voluntary, with limited exceptions. Small
businesses and agricultural employers are strongly opposed to mandatory E-
Verify and actively lobby against it. The American Farm Bureau Foundation
stated in July that it "could have a signicant, negative impact on US farm
production, threatening the livelihoods of many farmers and ranchers in labor
intensive agriculture." Similarly, within the European Union, representatives of
Business Europe are opposed to the Commissions idea that employers should
check the validity of residence permits and risk being excluded from public con-
tracts and, under certain circumstances, penalised by temporary or permanent
closure of their companies (Bertozzi, 2009).
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6 Conclusion
This paper has addressed a simple question: is there a role for the state to
regulate migration ows by selling visas to would-be migrants?
The answer is nuanced. When smugglers have already paid xed costs to
settle their businesses, it is di¢cult for the government to compete. The model
shows that dismantling smugglers networks by proposing a low enough price
would be at the cost of increasing substantially migration ows and decreasing
the average skill level of migrants. Hence there is a trade-o¤ between suppressing
smugglers or having fewer migrants in the economy.
If the goal is to control migration, demand is the lowest with a monopolistic
smuggler. Hence increasing cartelisation of the market and/or increasing repres-
sion contribute to controlling migration ows. However, such measures are not
satisfactory either, as they increase the price paid by illegal migrants and, hence,
increase the amount of resources feeding the illegal sector of the economy. The
paper proposes instead to combine di¤erent types of repression measures with
pricing tools to dismantle the smugglers while limiting migration ows. Simple
calibrations show that the additional investments required to reach this objec-
tive strongly decrease with the degree of risk entailed by illegal migration. For
probabilities of deportation between 20% and 70% the price of visas that permit
evicting the smugglers, calibrated using rough estimates borrowed from the lit-
erature, ranges between $18; 336 and $46; 575, which would lead to an increase
in migration demand between 24% and 49%. The paper hence illuminates the
complementarity between repression and legalisation.
Finally, the question that remains largely open is why a policy mix using
traditional instruments combined with pricing tools has not yet been imple-
mented to eradicate the smuggling industry. Although answering this question
is beyond the scope of the paper, we may consider a few hypotheses that are
worth investigating in future work and other elds of social sciences. In coun-
tries like France one immediate answer is that the legal framework is very strong
and could not easily be modied to introduce such pricing schemes, which, in
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the eld of migration, would be considered as unethical or violating human
rights.38 From this viewpoint, it is not clear that transparent pricing tools
would be less ethical than the existing policy of visa rationing, which creates
"rents" to the lucky applicants, generates important monetary "hidden costs",
such as briberies, paid by all applicants, and feeds all kinds of illegal activities.
A second answer suggested by our results is that "natives" may prefer to
have fewer and lowly paid illegal immigrants rather than a larger number of
legal workers, who would enjoy a more complete set of rights, including ac-
cess to social benets, public services and political rights. Moreover, given the
discrepancies between the investments in external and internal controls, the de-
bated e¤ectiveness of border enforcement measures and the availability of new
technologies, systematic controls of undocumented workers at the workplace is
a much more promising means of controlling illegal migration than border en-
forcement. Accordingly, e¤ective migration control should involve reinforcing
sanctions paid by employers of illegal migrants. Although this may be a more
cost-e¤ective way to combine legalisation with migration control than reinforc-
ing border controls, such policy will typically encounter strong resistance from
powerful lobbies as observed for example in the EU and in the US. This also
suggests that the status quo reects complex political-economy issues with some
people benetting more than others from lax enforcement. All these considera-
tions may explain why, under current policies, a large number of illegal migrants
still bear the costs of being exploited in destination areas and face the constant
risk of being deported.
38Moreover people may not be willing to trade a sacred value such as the right to immigrate
for money -what psychologist Philip Tetlock (2007) refers to as a "taboo tradeo¤".
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8 Appendix
8.1 Negative or intermediate self-selection of illegal work-
ers
In the presentation of our model we assumed that illegal workers self-select posi-
tively through migration according to their skill level. This generates interesting
ndings as a government will compete with smugglers to attract the highest skill
workers of the poor economy by selling migration visas. However, depending on
the relative returns to skill in the origin and destination countries the case of
negative self-selection of workers (i.e. from the bottom of the skill distribution
in the origin economy) through illegal migration cannot be ruled out, although
we may argue that the high costs entailed by long distance migration may more
likely yield positive selection. Moreover the existence of liquidity constraints
may also generate an intermediate selection of illegal workers (i.e. from the
middle of the skill distribution). These two types of selection characterise suc-
cessively the large migration ows of undocumented Mexican workers to the US
in the low costs period pre 1993 and high costs periods post 1993 as shown by
Borger 2011.
To give the intuition of how the results would change in the case of negative
selection, we will adopt the extreme assumption that workers working in the
illegal sector of the destination country are paid at a at rate, dwf which does
not depend on their skill.39 After writing the migration condition as wh <
dwf p; we can solve for the skill threshold, noted 
I ; below which an individual
prefers to migrate illegally than not to migrate:
I =
dwf   p
wh
(26)
This shows that workers are more likely to migrate the higher the wage di¤er-
ential between foreign and home countries and the lower their productivity.
After aggregating over the distribution of skills, we obtain the demand for
39Such extreme assumption could be relaxed by considering a atter rate of return to skill
in the illegal sector of the foreign country as compared to the labour market in the origin
country, without changing the key insight of this Appendix.
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illegal migration as a function of migration price p:
DI(p) =
Z I
0
f()d = F (I) (27)
As I decreases with p and wh and increases with d and wf , it is easy to
show that, once again, the demand for illegal migration is higher the lower the
migration price, p, and the higher the wages di¤erential dwf   wh between the
two countries.
We next study what happens if the government enters the migration market
and sells visas. If returns to skill are higher in the legal sector of the destination
country than in origin country legal migration will attract the highest skilled
workers. Therefore, following the legalisation policy, a di¤erent pool of workers,
who would not have migrated illegally otherwise, will decide to migrate legally.
Moreover, there will be a large increase in the average skill level of migrants
due to the positive selection of new immigrants through legal migration, who
cross the border in addition to the pool of illegal migrants. It is this clear that
the government cannot compete with the established smugglers using the policy
instruments studied above, unless it proposes a price so low that it attracts all
the workers.
So, if the aim of the policy is to eradicate human smuggling by attracting
the demand from low skilled-workers while controlling migration ows, a more
e¤ective policy would be to sell visas to low skilled-workers only and the same
reasoning as in the present paper would hence apply but at the bottom of the
skill distribution.
In a more exible model with intermediate selection of undocumented work-
ers due to liquidity constraints (Borger 2011) and positive selection of legal
workers the sale of visas should still be targeted at lower skill workers to be
e¤ective at pushing smugglers out of business.
43
8.2 Market Equilibrium and an illustration in the case of
uniform distribution
We model the oligopolistic market for illegal migration as a generalized Cournot
competition. We focus on symmetric equilibrium (i.e., each smuggler has the
same market share). Let P I(Q) = (dwf   wh)F 1(1   Q) denote the inverse
demand function for illegal migration. Smuggler j = 1; ::; N maximises with
respect to quantity Qj the prot function:
j(Qj ; Q j) =

P I(Qj +Q j)  c

Qj
where c represents the marginal costs for the smuggler and Q j =
P
k 6=j Q
k
is the o¤er made by the competitors of j = 1; :::; N . The rst order condition
is su¢cient under the assumption that the demand function is not too convex.
In a symmetric equilibrium Qj = Q
N
and the generalized Cournot price with N
smugglers, pN , is such that (3) holds.
We next illustrate the market equilibrium with the example of a uniform
distribution of skills over [0; 1], which gives easily tractable closed form solutions.
From (1) and (2) we can write explicitly the demand for illegal migration as:
DI(p) = 1 
p
dwf   wh
(28)
In the case of a generalized Cournot competition, we can use (3) to establish
that the price is as follows:
pN =
dwf   wh +Nc
N + 1
such that pm(= p1) = dwf wh2 +
c
2 and p
1(= limN!+1 p
N ) = c.
We deduce that the generalized Cournot demand is
DI(pN ) =
N
N + 1

1 
c
dwf   wh

Depending on the degree of competitiveness of the market, measured by N ,
the demand is between the demand on monopolistic market DI(pm) = 12  
c
2(dwf wh)
; and the demand in perfect competition DI(c) = 2DI(pm).
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8.3 Proof of dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0
To show that dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 we totally di¤erentiate (3) where the direct price
elasticity of demand, which is derived from (8), is parameterized by pL.
We obtain that
dpI(pL)
dpL
=  
(pI   c)@
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
+ 1
N
@DI(pI ;pL)
@pL
N+1
N
@DI(pI ;pL)
@pI
+ (pI   c)@
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI2
(29)
Second order condition of the oligopoly optimization problem implies that the
denominator is negative. For instance with a uniform distribution it is easy
to check that @
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI2
= 0. Moreover we focus on a normal good so that
@DI(pI ;pL)
@pI
< 0. A su¢cient condition for the numerator to be positive is that
@2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
> 0. Using equation (8) we can easily show that this is always
true as long as f 0()  0, which characterises for example the case with a
uniform distribution (f 0() = 0 over the support). It is also true when the
density function is strictly decreasing as in developing countries where the vast
majority of people do not have any education and are thus low skilled.QED
8.4 Uniform Distribution Example for Proposition 2
This section develops Proposition 2 in the case of a uniform distribution of
skills distributed over 0 and 1. The demand faced by the smugglers when the
government proposes a (legal) migration price, pL, is:
DI(pI ; pL) =
Z pL pI
(1 d)wf
pI
dwf wh
f()d =
Z pL pI
(1 d)wf
pI
dwf wh
d =
pL   pI
(1  d)wf
 
pI
dwf   wh
(30)
We deduce that the inverse demand function faced by the smugglers is:
P I(Q; pL) =
dwf   wh
wf   wh
(pL   (1  d)wfQ) (31)
Smuggler j = 1; ::; N maximises with respect to qj the prot function:
j(qj ; Q j) =

P I(qj +Q j ; pL)  c

qj
where c represents the marginal costs for the smuggler and Q j =
P
k 6=j q
k is
the o¤er made by the competitors of j = 1; :::; N . In a symmetric equilibrium
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qj = Q
N
so that the Cournot quantity QN is such that:
P I(QN ; pL)  c+
@P I(QN ; pL)
@QN
QN
N
= 0 (32)
Symmetrically the generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN , is such
that:
pN   c
pN
=
1
N
1
"DI ;pI
(33)
Second order condition requires that
@2P I(Q; pL)
@Q2
Q
N
+ 2
@P I(Q; pL)
@Q
 0 (34)
which is always true with the uniform distribution example (see (31)).
Substituting (31) in the equation (32) we deduce that
QN (pL) =
N
N + 1
(pL   c
wf   wh
dwf   wh
)
1
(1  d)wf
(35)
or, alternatively, that
PN (pL) = P I(QN (pL); pL) =
pL
N + 1
dwf   wh
wf   wh
+
N
1 +N
c (36)
We now turn to showing that such reaction smugglers price is smaller than
the price imposed by the smugglers under unconstrained oligopoly. With the
uniform distribution example, replacing (10) into (13) the upper limit for the
visa price satises:
pL = [Nc+ (1 +N)(1  d)wf ]
wf   wh
(1  d)wf +N(wf   wh)
(37)
Comparing the reaction smugglers price pI(pL) with the unconstrained smug-
glers oligopoly price pN = dwf wh+Nc
N+1 dened in (4) it is straightforward to
check that pI(pL)  pN if and only if dwf  wh  c, which is a necessary condi-
tion for the smugglers to be active in the rst place. Indeed from (1), we obtain
that: dwf   wh > pI otherwise there is no illegal migrant. Moreover, neces-
sarily c < pI otherwise smugglers do not operate. Therefore, when smugglers
operate, the condition c < dwf   wh is necessarily satised, which implies that
pI(pL) < p
N : QED
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8.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Let pL(R1; R2) =
wf wh
d(R2)wf wh
c(R1) be the price which pushes smugglers out of
business and let DL(R1; R2) = 1   F

pL(R1;R2)
wf wh

the legal demand for visas
associated with this price. The problem (17) the government aims to solve is
equivalent to:
max
R1;R2
pL(R1; R2) s.t. R1 +R2  DL(R1; R2)pL(R1; R2) (38)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is :
L = pL(R1; R2) + 
n
DL(R1; R2)p
L(R1; R2)  (R1 +R2)
o
(39)
The Lagrangian derivatives are for k = 1; 2 :
@L
@Rk
=
@pL
@Rk

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@Rk
   (40)
Focusing on interior solutions, the optimal combination of (R1; R2) satises
necessarily @L
@R1
= @L
@R2
, which yields:
@pL
@R2

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@R2
=
@pL
@R1

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@R1
Simplifying this expression by noting that @D
L
@Rk
=  
@pL
@Rk
wf wh
f

pL(R1;R2)
wf wh

, the
optimal combinaison of (R1; R2) is such that
@pL
@R1
=
@pL
@R2
, which yields equation
(19). The Lagrangian derivative with respect to  yields equation (18). We now
check with a simple example that the set of functions supporting an interior
solution is not empty.
An example:
Lets assume that wh ' 0 and that c(R) = c 1+2R1+R and d(R) =
d
1+R . Consis-
tently with the model assumptions c(R) is increasing and concave and d(R)
is decreasing and convex. Lets note k(R) = c
0(R)
c(R) =
1
(1+R)(1+2R) and let
g(R) =  d
0(R R)
d(R R)
= 1
1+R R
for all R 2 [0; R] with R being a xed point such
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that R = DL(R;R   R)pL(R;R   R). The interior solution of our problem is
determined by that: k(R) = g(R).40
R2(R) = R R

1(R) = R+ 1 
s
1 +
R
2
(41)
It is easy to check that both R1(R) and R

2(R) take their value between [0; R].
They constitute an interior solution of the optimisation problem.
Let pL(R) = pL(R1(R); R

2(R)) and D
L(R) = DL(R1(R); R

2(R)). To com-
plete the proof we need to show that there exists a xed point, R > 0, such that
R = DL(R)pL(R).
The assumption wh ' 0 implies that pL(R) =
c(R1)
d(R2)
= c
d
1+2R1
1+R1
(1 + R2).
Substituting R1 and R

2 by their value from (41) and rearranging the expression
we get
pL(R) =
c
d
q
2(2 +R)  1
2
(42)
We deduce that R is the solution to:
R =
c
d
 p
2(2 +R)  1
2
1 
c
dwf
 p
2(2 +R)  1
2
(43)
The demand is dened if 1  c
dwf
 p
2(2 +R)   1
2
, which is equivalent to
R  Rmax = 0:5

1 +
q
dwf
c
2
  2. We deduce that Rmax > 0 if and only if
dwf
c
> 1 (44)
Note that this assumption is always veried whenever there is some human
smuggling: c < dwf. Therefore Rmax > 0 and it is straightforward to check
that R exists. Indeed when R = 0 the left hand side of equation (43) is equal to
LHS(0) = 0, while the right hand side is equal to RHS(0) = c
d

1  c
dwf

> 0
under (44). Symmetrically the left hand side of equation (43) when R = Rmax
is equal to LHS(Rmax) = Rmax > 0 under (44), while RHS(Rmax) = 0.
40 It is easy to check that k0(R) < 0 and that g0(R) > 0 8R 2 [0; R]. Since k(R) is strictly
decreasing and g(R) is strictly increasing for all R 2 [0; R], and since g(0) < k(0); and
g(R) > k(R) 8R > 0, there exists an unique interior solution to k(R) = g(R).
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Since both functions are continuous they cross necessarily at least once at R 2
(0; Rmax).
Moreover, after noting that:
RHS0(R) = 2
c
d
"p
2(2 +R)  1p
2(2 +R)
#
1 
c
dwf
2(
p
2(2 +R)  1)2

we can check that RHS0(R) < 0 , dwf < 2c(
p
2(2 +R)   1)2; which is for
instance true if 2 > dwf
c
> 1. In this case the function LHS(:) is increasing
and RHS(:) is decreasing: they cross only once. QED
8.6 Risk aversion
Proof of Lemma 1
Applying the expected utility theorem and comparing the individuals ex-
pected utility in case he/she migrates, equal to (1  q)u(wf pI)+qu
 
wh   p
I

with the expected utility in case she does not migrate, equal to u (wh), we can
write the migration condition as: u (wh) < (1 q)u(wf pI)+qu
 
wh   p
I

.
Studying the threshold such that an individual is just indi¤erent between mi-
grating illegally or not migrating, the marginal type Ira is the solution of the
following equation: u (wh) = (1 q)u(wf pI)+qu
 
wh   p
I

. Substituting
u(x) = 1  exp( ax) and rearranging this expression, we obtain the illegal mi-
gration threshold Ira as a solution of the equation (21):
1 e ap
I
1 e a(wf wh)
= 1  q.
Let () = 1 e
 apI
1 e a(wf wh)
. Deriving twice the function () one can easily
check that it is decreasing and convex in . Moreover lim!0 () = +1 and
lim!1 () = 1  e
 apI . We deduce, rst, that if q is strictly lower than e ap
I
then Ira exists and is unique and, second, that 
I
ra is increasing with q.
We can write the demand for illegal migration as a function of the migration
price pI similarly as before, except that I is now replaced by Ira:
DIra(p
I) =
Z 
Ira
f()d = 1  F (Ira) (45)
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As Ira increases with p
I and decreases with , the demand for migration remains
higher the lower the migration price, pI , and the higher the wages di¤erential
wf wh between the two countries. The logic of the pricing scheme of smugglers
described in section 2 remains thus the same as before but it takes into account
the new (lower) demand from risk averse individuals (45).
We now formally show in the uniform example that risk aversion implies that
the price imposed by smugglers is then lower than the price they would impose
to risk neutral individuals with the same expected revenue from migration With
risk neutrality we have I(p) = p
dwf wh
and
DI(p) =
Z 1
I
f()d = 1  F (I) = 1  I(p) (46)
We deduce that the (absolute value) of the price elasticity of demand is:
"
D;p
=
 DI0(p)p
DI(p)
=
I(p)
1  I(p)
=
p
(dwf   wh)  p
With risk aversion, we have Ira which is such that:
1  e ap
1  e a(wf wh)
= 1  q (47)
We deduce that :
Ira(p) =
log(1  q)  log (e ap   q))
a(wf   wh)
(48)
the demand is:
DIra(p) =
Z 1
Ira
f()d = 1  F (Ira) = 1  
I
ra(p) (49)
It is straightforward to check that if q = 0 (i.e., there is no risk of deportation
in migrating illegally) then  = d so that Ira(p) = 
I(p).
We deduce that the (absolute value) of the price elasticity of demand is:
"
Dra;p
=
 DI0ra(p)p
DIra(p)
=
p e
 ap
e ap q
(wf   wh) 
log(1 q) log(e ap q))
a
(50)
Here again it is easy to check that "
Dra;p
= "
D;p
when q = 0. After di¤erentiating
"
Dra;p
with respect to q  1 and noting that a(wf wh) log(1 q)+log(e ap 
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q) > 0 as 0 < Ira(p) < 1 one can check that "Dra;p increases with q:
d"
Dra;p
dq


a(wf   wh)  log(1  q) + log
 
e ap   q)
 
+
1  e ap
1  q
> 0 (51)
So when the risk q augments the demand price elasticity increases, and thus,
everything else being equal, the monopoly price is lower.QED
Proof of Lemma 2
We now turn to the government policy of visa sale and the reaction of smug-
glers. If individuals can buy a legal permit to migrate at price pL, smugglers
need to price their services low enough so that at least one individual wishes
to migrate illegally. The skill level Lra of the marginal illegal migrant who is
just indi¤erent between migrating illegally and legally satises u
 
wf   p
L

=
(1   q)u(wf   p
I) + qu
 
wh   p
I

. Substituting u(x) = 1   exp( ax) and
rearranging this expression, we obtain the legal migration threshold Lra as a
solution of the following equation:
1  e a((wf wh)+p
I pL)
1  e a(wf wh)
= 1  q (52)
Solving for the threshold Lra and comparing it to (6) we show in the following
that Lra < 
L:
Proof. Let () = 1 e
 a((wf wh)+p
I
 pL)
1 e a(wf wh)
. Equation (52)denes Lra as a solution
of () = 1   q. The benchmark case of risk neutrality is obtained by setting
q = 0 in this equation. Indeed when q = 0 and  = d the unique solution of
() = 1 is L dened equation (6). This also implies that the function ()
crosses once and only once the horizontal line 1.
Next, deriving () with respect to  yields:
0() =
a(1  e a((wf wh)+p
I pL))
1  e a(wf wh)
(
(wf   wh)e
 a((wf wh)+p
I pL)
1  e a((wf wh)+p
I pL)
 
(wf   wh)e
 a(wf wh)
1  e a(wf wh)
)
To study the sign of 0() we consider 2 cases:
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 If   p
L pI
wf wh
then (wf wh)+pI pL  0 so that 1 e a((wf wh)+p
I pL) 
0. Since by assumption wf  wh  wf  wh  0 all the other elements in
the fractions composing 0() are positive. We deduce that both the rst
term and the term in the brackets are negative such that 0() > 0.
 If p
L pI
wf wh
<   p
L pI
(1 )wf
= L then 0 < (wf wh)+pI pL  (wf wh)
and 1   e a((wf wh)+p
I pL) > 0. Since 1   e ax is log concave in x,
we have that e
 a((wf wh)+p
I
 pL)
1 e a((wf wh)+p
I pL)
 e
 a(wf wh)
1 e a(wf wh)
. Moreover we have
wf wh  wf wh  0 such that the term in the brackets is now positive.
Similarly the rst term is also now positive such that 0() > 0.
We have just shown that the continuous function () is increasing for  2
[0; L]. Moreover it crosses once and only once the horizontal line at q = 0 for
 = L. We deduce that for  > L () > 1 so that equation (52) never holds.
The relevant domain for Lra in equation (52) when q varies between 0 and 1 is
 2 [0; L]. This implies that if Lra exists it is necessarily such that 
L
ra  
L
with a strict inequality for any q > 0.
To nish the proof of Lemma 2 we need to show that Lra exists and is unique.
It is done by noting that lim!0 () =  1. So the function () strictly
increases between  1 and 1 when  varies between 0 and L. It necessarily
crosses the line q 2 [0; 1] once and only once.QED
Proof of Lemma 3
In order to eradicate the smugglers we know that
Ira(c) = 
L
ra(c; p
L
ra
) (53)
with Ira(c) =
log(1 q) log(e ca q)
a(wf wh)
Moreover, from (21) Lra(c; p
L
ra
) is the implicit solution of
1  q =
1  e a((wf wh)+c p
L
ra
)
1  e a(wf wh)
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This implies that pL
ra
satises the following equation
(1  q) (1  e a(wf wh)) = 1  e a((wf wh)+c p
L
ra
)
with  = Ira(c) =
log(1  q)  log (e ca   q))
a(wf   wh)
This yields successively that:
c = Ira(c)(wf   wh) + c  p
L
ra
pL
ra
=
log(1  q)  log (e ca   q))
a(wf   wh)
(wf   wh) (54)
and we can check easily that dpL
ra
=dq > 0:QED
The reasoning of section 3.2.2 remains valid under risk aversion. The IR
constraint, which can be written 1   e a(wf p
L)  1   e awh , is unchanged.
The IC constraint becomes 1  e a(wf p
L)  (1  q) (1  e a(wf p
I))+ q(1 
e a(wh p
I)). The IC constraint is binding if (1  q) (1  e a(wf p
I)) + q(1 
e a(wh p
I))  1   e awh , which is a necessary condition for the smuggler to
be active. So if the smuggler is active the binding constraint is the IC and pLra
is the solution of the following equation:
e a(wf p
L) = (1  q) e a(wf p
I
ra(p
L)) + qe a(wh p
I
ra(p
L))
Proof of Proposition 4
Using three instruments to eradicate human smuggling while controlling mi-
gration ows, the government solves :
max
R1;R2;R3
pL(R1; R2; R3) s.t. R1+R2+R3  DL(R1; R2; R3)pL(R1; R2; R3)
(55)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is :
L = pL(R1; R2; R3)+
n
DL(R1; R2; R3)p
L(R1; R2; R3) (R1+R2+R3)
o
(56)
The Lagrangian derivatives are for k = 1; 2; 3 :
@L
@Rk
=
@pL
@Rk

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@Rk
   (57)
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Focusing on interior solutions, the optimal combination of (R1; R2; R3) satises
necessarily: @L
@R1
= @L
@R2
= @L
@R3
. Simplifying this expression by noting that
@DL
@Rk
=  
@pL
@Rk
wf wh
f

pL(R1;R2;R3)
wf wh

yields that the optimal combination is such
that
@pL
@R1
=
@pL
@R2
=
@pL
@R3
, which yields equation (25). Moreover the Lagrangian
derivative with respect to  yields equation (24).QED
Link with Becker (1968)
Assuming to simplify that wh = 0 we can determine the investments such
that expected earnings from illegal migration, (1  q(R3))(R2)wf + q(R3)wh =
(1  q(R3))(R2)wf , are minimized under the budget constraint R2 +R3 = R.
As R2 = R R3, R3 is the solution to:
 0(R R3)
(R R3)
=
q0(R3)
1  q(R3)
(58)
Under the assumption that the functions 1   q(R) and (R) are log convex,
which is for instance the case when q(R) = 1  q=(1+R) and (R) = =(1+R),
the function f(R) = q
0(R)
1 q(R) decreases with R and the function g(R) =
 0(R R)
(R R)
increases with R. Under the assumption that f(0) > g(0) and f(R) < g(R) then
Rrn3 solution of (58) exists and is unique. When for instance q(R) = 1 q=(1+R)
and (R) = =(1 + R) then g(R) = 1
1+R R
and f(R) = 11+R . This implies
f(0) = 1 > g(0) = 1
1+R
and f(R) = 1
1+R
< g(R) = 1 so that Rrn3 = R=2. This
determines the optimal allocation of investment between the two instruments
to reduce migration ows under the assumption of risk neutrality.
However, if individuals are risk-averse, minimizing the ow of migrants is
not equivalent to minimising expected earnings of would be migrants. Using our
model, minimizing the ow of migrants is equivalent to maximizing the price of
visas, which can be written as pL
ra
(R3) =
log(1 q(R3)) log(e ca q(R3))
a(R R3)wf
(wf  wh):
Assuming again to simplify that wh = 0, we can rewrite the price pLra(R3) =
log(1 q(R3)) log(e ca q(R3))
a(R R3)
and maximise it with respect to R3 with the con-
straint that R3 +R2 = R:
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We nd that
@pL
ra
=@R3 =
1
a(R R3)

q0(R3)
1  q(R3)

1  q(R3)
e ca   q(R3)
  1

+
0(R R3)
(R R3)

log (1  q(R3))  log(e
 ca   q(R3))

Under risk aversion an interior solution of our problem is such that @pL
ra
=@R3 =
0, which determines implicitly the optimal investment Rra3 as solution of the
following equation:
 0(R R3)
(R R3)
=
q0(R3)
1  q(R3)
1 q(R3)
e ca q(R3)
  1
log(1  q(R3)  log (e ca   q(R3))
(59)
By comparing (58) and (59) it is easy to see that the investment to increase
the probability of deportation is higher under risk aversion than under risk
neutrality: Rra3 > R
rn
3 . Indeed, since f(R) =
q0(R)
1 q(R) decreases and g(R) =
 0(R R)
(R R)
increases with R, Rra3 > R
rn
3 if the function f(R) is shifted to the
right (i.e., if it increases). This depends on the distortion in (59) being greater
than 1, which is equivalent to:
1  q(R3)
e ca   q(R3)
  1 > log

1  q(R3)
e ca   q(R3)

(60)
Since 1 q(R3)
e ca q(R3)
> 1 this is always true (i.e., x   logx   1 > 0 8x > 1). We
have thus established that q(Rrn3 ) is lower than the probability of deportation
q(Rra3 ), which minimises migration ows.QED
8.7 Rationality of migration decisions
This Appendix departs from the estimated prices paid by Chinese illegal mi-
grants to go to the US, which have been documented in Friebel and Guriev, 2006
and previous work to be above $35000 in mid 1990s and then continued to rise
and checks that the rationality constraint of our model is satised for the wages
di¤erential between the US and China observed in 2005 and for a large range
of wage di¤erentials observed between advanced and developing countries..
To calibrate d, we use Cobb-Clark and Kossoudjis (2002) estimates of 14
to 24% legalisation premia which, we round at 20%. Assuming d = 0:8 is also
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in line with the ndings of Rivera-Batiz (1999) on the gap in wages di¤erential
between legal and undocumented immigrants on the US market, which remains
unexplained by di¤erences in measured characteristics of these two groups.41
To calculate the net present value of working illegally in the US we follow
Friebel and Guriev, 2006, and take the average minimum wages in the US, $6:15
per hour, and assume that a migrant works 45 hours for 52 weeks per year over
a period of 40 years. Accordingly, assuming the discount and growth rates of
future wages are equal and without loss of generality setting it to zero, NPV
of earnings in the US is around $575640 (= 52  45  $6:15  40) Moreover,
estimates of the GDP per capita in China in terms of purchasing power parity
are in the range of $4000 such that, over 40 years, the NPV of earnings in
China are estimated around $160000 (= $4000  40).42 We can check that the
IR constraint, pI  (dwf wh); is largely satised (as pI < 5756400:8 160000)
for the case of the Chinese migration to the US.
More generally, we check that the constraint pI  wh(d
wf
wh
  1) is easily
satised for a large range of ratios wf
wh
(=2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, and 25) based
on wage di¤erentials between advanced and developing countries reported by
Freeman et al. (2000) or on purchasing power adjusted wages ratios computed
by Clemens et al. (2009) for workers who are otherwise observably identical.
However, since we do not have good estimates for the prices to cross illegally
from one origin to another destination country, we prefer to focus on the illegal
Chinese migration to the US for the remainder of our simulations.
8.8 Risk aversion and probability of deportation
From the Cournot Price (3) and replacing the price elasticity of the demand for
migration "
Dra;p
using our calculations above (50) we can write the marginal
41Although these estimates are based on Mexican immigrants and may be di¤erent for long-
distance illegal migrants, who may come from very di¤erent areas such as South East Asia,
Russia or Africa and may have di¤erent skill distributions, these are, to our knowledge, the
best available proxies.
42This estimate of GDP per capita reported by the CIA World Factbook 2005 corresponds
to a wage equal to 1.7 dollar per hour in China, which, given the adjustment by the dif-
ferential in purchasing power between China and the US, does not seem unreasonable. See
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
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costs for smugglers to operate, cra, as follows:
cra = p
I  
1
N
(wf   wh) 
log(1 q) log

e ap
I
 q

a
e ap
I
e ap
I q
(61)
Replacing in (61) with pI = 35000,  = 0:8, wf = 575640, wh = 160000, N = 2,
and cra = 10000 we can determine a set of absolute risk aversion parameters a,
which correspond to a set of deportation probabilities q.
To illustrate the magnitude of the policy implications of the model, we
present our results for four sets of compatible values (0:7; 0:00000086), (0:5; 0:00001),
(0:4; 0:00002), (0:2; 0:000039).
8.9 Simulations
8.9.1 Increase in demand following legalisation
Assuming a uniform distribution over [0; 1] the demand for illegal migration
in the absence of legalisation is: DIra(p
I) = 1   Ira; with 
I
ra solution of the
equation (21), such that:
DIra(p
I) = 1 
log(1  q)  log

e ap
I
  q

a(wf   wh)
(62)
whereas, following the legalisation, the demand becomes
DLra(p
L
ra
) = 1 
log(1  q)  log (e ac   q))
a(wf   wh)
(63)
For the values (a; q) discussed above we can simulate the relative increase in
migration demand following the policy as follows:
D =
DLra(p
L
ra
) DIra(p
I)
DIra(p
I)
=
log (e ca   q)  log

e ap
I
  q

a(wf   wh)  log(1  q) + log
 
e apI   q

8.9.2 Legalisation with migration control policy
Using the rst instrument, c
After replacing in DIra(p
I) = DL

pL
ra
(R)

we nd that c(R) must satisfy
the following equation:
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log(1  q)  log

e ap
I
  q

a(wf   wh)
=
log(1  q)  log
 
e ac(R
)   q)

a(wf   wh)
which is equivalent to pI = c(R):
Varying the risk of deportation following the policy
If the government invests in additional repression such that q = q(R3), the
required amount of additional e¤orts to keep constant the migration demand
following the legalisation is such that:
log(1  q)  log

e ap
I
  q

a(wf   wh)
=
log(1  q)  log
 
e ac(R
)   q)

a(wf   wh)
(64)
which is equivalent to e ac(R
) =

1  q
1  q

e ap
I
  q

+ q (65)
This shows that @c(R)=@q < 0.
We can hence compute the relative increase in marginal costs, or c =
c(R) c
c
; which is necessary to eliminate the smugglers without increasing the
demand as a function of risk of deportation q and check that it decreases with
q:
Using the second instrument, 
Similarly, after replacing in DIra(p
I) = DL

pL
ra
(R)

we nd that (R)
solution of the following equation
log(1  q)  log

e ap
I
  q

a(wf   wh)
=
log(1  q)  log (e ac   q))
a((R)wf   wh)
(66)
which is equivalent to:
(R)wf   wh
wf   wh
=
log( 1 q

e ac q
)
log( 1 q
e ap
I
 q
)
Using the solution of this equation we can compute  = (R
) 

and check
that , which is negative, gets closer to zero as q increases.
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8.9.3 Robustness checks: Varying the number of smugglers on the
market
First we can check that the observations of a large di¤erential between the
migration price charged by smugglers (i.e., p = 35000) and the marginal cost
(i.e., c = 10000) is not compatible with a relatively competitive market. The
large markup suggests a cartelized smuggling market. For instance assuming
N = 10 or above would imply, using equation (61), that deportation risk is
below 0:05 which is not very realistic.
For our simulations above we assumed that N = 2: We now turn to testing
the sensitivity of our results if the market for smugglers is characterised by
N = 3 and N = 5 smugglers. Simulations presented in the tables A1 and A2
show the magnitude of the implied changes. Note that, similarly as above, the
degrees of risk aversion and deportation probabilities displayed in the rst two
rows of each table have been chosen to be compatible with the observations
c = 10000 and p = 35000 characterising the market for Chinese illegal migrants.
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Tables
Table 1: Policy implications for N=2 when risk q varies for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion a.
a 0.00000086 0.00001 0.00002 0.00004
q 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
pL
ra
43624 46575 49954 28232 29516 30924 23785 24726 25744 17755 18336 18957
D 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.30
c 2.73 2.50 2.26 2.67 2.50 2.33 2.67 2.50 2.34 2.70 2.50 2.32
 -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.51 -0.51 -0.50 -0.52 -0.52 -0.51 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52
Note: prices pL
ra
are in USD
Tables in Appendix
Table A1: Policy implications for N=3 when risk q varies for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion a.
a 0.000002 0.000008 0.000015 0.000035
q 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
pL
ra
33361 35069 36961 27621 28819 30127 23429 24319 25280 17650 18211 18810
D 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.23
c 2.68 2.50 2.32 2.66 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.50 2.35 2.68 2.50 2.33
 -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.50 -0.49 -0.48 -0.51 -0.50 -0.49 -0.52 -0.51 -0.51
Note: prices pL
ra
are in USD
Table A2: Policy implications for N=5 when risk q varies for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion a.
a 0.0000005 0.000005 0.000026
q 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
pL
ra
24749 25670 26663 22658 23446 24291 17414 17932 18481
D 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.17
c 2.63 2.50 2.37 2.63 2.50 2.37 2.64 2.50 2.36
 -0.46 -0.45 -0.44 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49
Note: prices pL
ra
are in USD
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Figure 1: Pricing scheme of the smugglers pI(pL) in the uniform example
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